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Meaningless Guarantees: Comment
on Mitchell E. McCloy’s “Blind
Justice: Virginia’s Jury Sentencing
Scheme and Impermissible Burdens
on a Defendant’s Right to a Jury
Trial”
Alexandra L. Klein
If the criminal justice system believes that it can formulate
coherent rules to achieve moral accuracy, the legislature and
courts need to write those rules and allow them to be
explained to juries in ways that make certain that juries are
not being forced to “fill in the blanks” for the legal system.1

INTRODUCTION
Despite the important role that jurors play in the American
criminal justice system, jurors are often deprived of critical
information that might help them make sense of the law their
oaths require them to follow. Such information with regard to
sentencing might include the unavailability of parole, geriatric
release, sentencing guidelines, or other information that is
relevant to determining a defendant’s penalty. Withholding

Visiting Assistant Professor, Washington & Lee University School of
Law. My sincere thanks to Mitch McCloy, for the opportunity to discuss his
excellent Note, and to Brandon Hasbrouck for his comments and suggestions
on drafts.
1. SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE
DEATH PENALTY 184 (2005).
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information from juries, particularly in sentencing,2 risks
unjust and inequitable sentences. Keeping jurors in the dark
perpetuates injustices and undermines public confidence and
trust in the justice system.
Mitch McCloy’s excellent Note provides a compelling
illustration of this problem in jury sentencing in Virginia.3 Until
very recently, when criminal defendants in Virginia exercised
their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, they had been
sentenced by that jury in a bifurcated trial system.4 Although
the trial judge provides the jury with information about the
statutory minimum and maximum sentences, Virginia law
provides that juries are not allowed to receive any information
about Virginia’s sentencing guidelines.5 The jury may not offer
recommendations about whether sentences should be
suspended or run concurrently or consecutively.6
These sentencing practices led, unsurprisingly, to
inequitable results: defendants who exercised their Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial tended to receive far harsher
sentences than defendants who waived that right and selected
a bench trial. Mr. McCloy’s Note thoroughly evaluates the
statutory and constitutional dimensions of this problem. Mr.
McCloy’s Note is an exceptional piece of scholarship as well as a
useful tool for academics, legislators, practitioners, and judges
to understand the complexities of Virginia’s sentencing scheme.

2. See Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818, 1820 (2016) (per curiam)
(holding that the defendant was entitled to inform the jury that he was
ineligible for parole where the only type of release available under state law
was executive clemency); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 169 (1994)
(“Because truthful information of parole ineligibility allows the defendant to
‘deny or explain’ the showing of future dangerousness, due process plainly
requires that he be allowed to bring it to the jury’s attention . . . .”); Fishback
v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629, 634 (Va. 2000).
3. See generally Mitchell E. McCloy, Note, Blind Justice: Virginia’s Jury
Sentencing Scheme and Impermissible Burdens on a Defendant’s Right to a
Jury Trial, 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519 (2021).
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (2020).
5. See id. § 19-2-298.01(A) (“In cases tried by a jury, the jury shall not
be presented any information regarding sentencing guidelines.”).
6. Id. § 19.2-303.
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It is a compelling demonstration of inequity in Virginia’s
criminal justice system that offers several practical solutions.
Part I of this Comment discusses Mr. McCloy’s findings,
analysis, and ultimate conclusions. Part II briefly explores two
significant questions that arise from Mr. McCloy’s Note: the
consequences of recognizing rights without meaningful
enforcement and the problem of jurors’ preference for harsher
sentences. This Comment concludes by offering some final
thoughts on the necessary work to make our justice system live
up to the promise of “Equal Justice Under Law.”
I.

THE ABSENCE OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial
in criminal prosecutions.7 Courts have lauded the important
role juries serve in the criminal justice system.8 Jury
participation serves key democratic functions.9 It ensures
“continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people.”10 The
right to a jury trial prevents government oppression.11 Jury
trials reflect checks on government power by “insistence upon
community participation in the determination of guilt or
innocence.”12
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”).
8. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1395 (2020) (“[T]he [Sixth
Amendment] promise of a jury trial surely meant something—otherwise, there
would have been no reason to write it down.”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 149 (1968) (“[T]rial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice . . . .”).
9. See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2019) (“Other than
voting, serving on a jury is the most substantial opportunity that most citizens
have to participate in the democratic process.”).
10. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (“Jury service preserves the
democratic elements of the law, as it guards the rights of the parties and
ensures continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people.”); Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615–16 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the
jury as the “conscience of the community”).
11. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155–56; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86–87
(1986).
12. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156; see Powers, 499 U.S. at 411–12.
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Yet Mr. McCloy points out that in 2019, “jury trials made
up just 1.3 percent of all cases in Virginia that resulted in a
felony conviction. . . . [B]ench trials made up 9 percent of all
cases and guilty pleas made up 90 percent.”13 Other jurisdictions
reveal similarly dismal statistics about the use of jury trials and
the predominance of the plea bargain.14 Setting aside issues
associated with plea bargaining,15 criminal defendants in
Virginia demonstrated a clear preference for bench trials.16
Given the noble purpose and democratic function of the jury
trial, why on earth did Virginia’s criminal defendants keep
choosing bench trials?
Mr. McCloy’s Note demonstrates a significant reason:
defendants who opt for bench trials are more likely to receive a
sentence within Virginia’s sentencing guidelines. He presents
compelling data illustrating that jurors’ sentencing
recommendations deviate upward from Virginia’s sentencing
guidelines far more frequently than when judges sentence
defendants.17 Perhaps even more troubling is the fact that,
although judges have the authority to modify a jury’s sentence
to one that comports with the guidelines, they rarely do—even
when a jury’s sentence produces a manifestly unjust result.18
Virginia’s decision to prohibit jurors from seeing the guidelines
creates incentive structures that discourage defendants from

13. McCloy, supra note 3, at 531.
14. Id. at 532.
15. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012) (discussing the
prevalence of plea bargaining); see also, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of
Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1033–34 (2006); H.
Michael Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the
Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 75–77 (2011). See generally Brandon
Hasbrouck, The Just Prosecutor, WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021); Thea
Johnson, Fictional Pleas, 94 IND. L.J. 855 (2019); Candace McCoy, Plea
Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea Bargaining Reform, 50
CRIM. L.Q. 67 (2005); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101
YALE L.J. 1979 (1992).
16. McCloy, supra note 3, at 532.
17. See id. at 534–36.
18. See id. at 537–39.
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exercising their constitutional rights, further exacerbating the
problem of the decline in jury trials nationally and in Virginia.19
Mr. McCloy has ably demonstrated that Virginia’s
sentencing scheme likely imposed impermissible burdens on
defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights. This is a complicated
issue, due in large part to shifting precedent from the Supreme
Court. United States v. Jackson,20 recognized that congressional
objectives “cannot be pursued by means that needlessly chill the
exercise of basic rights.”21 The flaw in the Federal Kidnapping
Act in Jackson was not its inherent coercion, but that it
“needlessly encourage[d]” defendants to plead guilty or waive
jury trials.22 Limiting the number of cases in which the death
penalty was imposed was a legitimate purpose, but the chosen
means—imposing it only when the defendant picked a jury
trial—was a poor fit for those purposes because it placed an
unnecessary burden on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.23
The Supreme Court undermined Jackson a decade later in
Corbitt v. New Jersey,24 when it approved a New Jersey
statutory scheme that provided that defendants whom the jury
convicted of first-degree murder received mandatory life
imprisonment, whereas defendants who pleaded guilty could be
sentenced to life imprisonment or a maximum 30-year
sentence.25 Corbitt erroneously focused on the difference in
penalties between that case and Jackson. In Jackson, the
defendant faced the death penalty, but in Corbitt, the defendant
was facing life in prison and the guilty plea did not guarantee a
reduced sentence.26

19. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent
of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the
result of guilty pleas.”).
20. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
21. Id. at 582.
22. Id. at 583.
23. See id. at 582–83. See generally Brady v. United States, 387 U.S. 742
(1970).
24. 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
25. Id. at 215–16.
26. Id. at 217–18.
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The problem, of course, is not the difference between life
and death. The tension between Jackson and Corbitt is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s death penalty
exceptionalism. The Supreme Court has required, as a matter
of due process that juries be told in capital cases when a
defendant is ineligible for parole if the defendant’s future
dangerousness is an issue.27 In that situation, the jury must be
informed so they do not unnecessarily sentence someone to
death. While this is necessary as a matter of due process,
decisions about keeping jurors in the dark may steer defendants
towards waiving their Sixth Amendment rights because juries
may be uninformed about the relevant law.
I do not dispute that facing the death penalty may be a
greater degree of coercion than other prison sentences.
Nonetheless, the difference in possible penalties, to the extent
that it undermines a defendant’s choice to exercise a
constitutional right, is contrary to a defendant’s right to
autonomy.28
Mr. McCloy offers a nuanced approach to Jackson,
suggesting it applies when there is an “impermissible purpose
or motivation” for a statute, such as “needlessly encourag[ing]
guilty pleas or waivers.”29 He reasons that, by restricting jury
access to sentencing guidelines when the jury must sentence the
defendant, Virginia’s sentencing system needlessly encourages
trial waivers because it is not connected to the legitimate
purpose of jury sentencing.30 The choice between a bench trial
and a jury trial in Virginia is illusory if a defendant exercises
their Sixth Amendment right to choose a jury trial and is
27. See, e.g., Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818, 1820 (2016) (per curiam);
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 169 (1994). Virginia has extended
this to noncapital felonies and requires judges to tell juries that parole has
been abolished. See Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629, 634 (Va.
2000).
28. Cf. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1505 (2018)
With individual liberty—and, in capital cases, life—at stake, it is
the defendant’s prerogative, not counsel’s, to decide on the objective
of his defense: to admit guilt in the hope of gaining mercy at the
sentencing stage, or to maintain his innocence, leaving it to the
State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
29. McCloy, supra note 3, at 542.
30. Id. at 543.
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promptly rewarded for their contribution to a democratic
punishment structure with a harsher sentence.
Criminal punishment in the United States focuses on
retribution rather than rehabilitation. Advocates for jury
sentencing have asserted that juries are better suited to reflect
community values and deliver an expressive message about the
defendant’s transgression of community norms and values. Yet
depriving the jury of critical information undermines
retributive values by creating some punishments that are
disproportionately higher than other punishments. It may also
invite juries to consider impermissible factors, such as race, or
lead to arbitrary punishments when a jury has to select an
appropriate penalty within a wide statutory minimum and
maximum.31
The guidelines are, of course, discretionary. But they better
serve critical retributive values of proportionality by ensuring
consistency in sentencing. A jury’s function as a “community
conscience” does not give it a monopoly on democratic
legitimacy. The legislative decision to create the Virginia
Criminal Sentencing Commission to standardize sentences also
represents democratic consensus.32 As Mr. McCloy explains, the
role of a community conscience also requires that community to
be informed about the processes of justice.33
Mr. McCloy’s analysis of the possible solutions is
impressively thorough. Eliminating mandatory jury sentencing
would solve part of the problem, and it would give defendants
greater autonomy of choice. There is room to critique whether
the criminal justice system actually could ever offer a defendant
true autonomy, but through this solution, defendants would
receive the benefit of a community judgment about their guilt or
innocence as well as a proportional sentence. That said, if the
jury does not receive sentencing guidelines, a defendant who
31. Cf. Alexis Hoag, Valuing Black Lives: A Case for Ending the Death
Penalty, 51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 985, 989 (2020) (arguing that discretion
in capital sentencing “allows . . . racism to operate undetected”).
32. I do not suggest that the Virginia General Assembly is somehow more
“just” than a jury, only that the sentencing guidelines are not necessarily less
democratically legitimate.
33. See McCloy, supra note 3, at 555–56.
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opted for jury sentencing may still receive a disproportionately
harsher sentence. In this scenario, the defendant at least would
retain a meaningful choice in the exercise of their critical Sixth
Amendment rights.
Virginia has taken this approach. Jury sentencing is no
longer mandatory for defendants who elected a jury trial, except
in capital cases.34 But this is arguably insufficient. Mr. McCloy
concludes that the best approach should include providing
jurors with completed sentencing worksheets for defendants as
well as the ability to offer recommendations about sentence
suspensions and whether sentences should be served
concurrently.35 Under his approach, defendants would have
more flexibility exercising their Sixth Amendment rights and
jurors would have the information they need (and often want) if
they are faced with the task of sentencing a defendant.
This, of course, does not help defendants who had to waive
their Sixth Amendment rights to a jury before the change to
Virginia’s law. Those defendants still deserve a remedy for the
possible violation of their fundamental constitutional rights. So
although Virginians can, and should celebrate this critical
reform, there is yet more work to be done.
As the United States considers the pressing need for
criminal justice reform, steps like those Mr. McCloy proposes
are essential. These reforms are not sweeping, given the
infrequency of jury trials in Virginia and in the United States.
Yet these reforms are critical because they help to ensure that
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is more than a
meaningless guarantee.
II.

THE MEANINGLESS GUARANTEE

Mr. McCloy’s Note raises two interesting considerations,
which I believe to be interrelated, that this section explores
further. First, courts undermine the meaningful nature of the
rights they extoll when they fail to give those rights substance.
Mr. McCloy’s Note highlights this problem by showing that

34.
255G.
35.

See SB 5007, 2020 Spec. Sess. (Va. 2020), https://perma.cc/Y5BHSee McCloy, supra note 3, at 561–62.
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failing to adequately inform a jury of sentencing standards leads
to arbitrarily harsher sentences. Second, in considering the
statistics Mr. McCloy had compiled, I began to wonder why,
when given the statutory minimum and maximum sentence
range, jurors tend to favor longer sentences.
There is a difference between the idealized version of a
constitutional right and the way the right is both realized and
enforceable.36 Guarantees of constitutional and individual
rights are not worth the paper they are printed on if
legislatures, executive officials, and courts do not act to ensure
adequate protection and enforcement for individual rights.
Likewise, what about situations in which members of a
community are charged to act in a way to facilitate someone
else’s constitutional right? If that community is inadequately
informed of its obligations, or fails to respect those rights, or its
conscience is perhaps not entirely clear, then the guarantee of
individual rights is essentially meaningless.
Juror participation is essential to uphold another member
of a community’s Sixth Amendment rights. But a jury trial is
not a guarantee that trials will be fair or that the sentence the
jury selects will serve justice. Looking back over United States
history, juries have not been the idealized version of democracy
courts describe. Through harmful community norms,
exclusionary tactics, and judicial inaction, the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial has too often been form without
substance.
Consider the historic practices that ensured that Black
people were not included in that community consensus either by
ensuring that Black people never made it on a jury or
diminished their participation by permitting nonunanimous

36. Cf. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 378 (1974) (“The equal protection clause states, I think,
the finest aspiration of our society . . . . But, as anyone who has tried to
challenge [discriminatory] practices in any forum knows, the fact of
discrimination is one thing and its proof is quite another.”).
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juries.37 In Strauder v. West Virginia,38 the Supreme Court
explained that discriminating in jury selection based on race
“amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the laws[.]”39
Nearly a century later, the Court repeated this principle in
Swain v. Alabama,40 only to conclude that the defendant had
not suffered unconstitutional discrimination when the
prosecutor struck all Black jurors because an attorney might
use peremptory strikes on any juror.41 The Court also brushed
aside concerns that juror rolls contained smaller numbers of
Black citizens than White citizens, despite a process that was
based primarily on state officials’ discretion to select men (often
men
they
knew
personally)
who
were
“honest,
intelligent . . . esteemed for their integrity, good character, and
sound judgment.”42
Batson v. Kentucky43 finally put a standard in place for
assessing when a peremptory strike demonstrated purposeful
discrimination.44 But Batson makes it awfully easy for a
prosecutor to come up with a “neutral explanation,” for an
alleged racially-motivated peremptory strike and has been
heavily criticized for its failings.45 Although the Supreme Court
has recently concluded that the Sixth Amendment incorporates

37. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394 (2020) (discussing the
origin of nonunanimous juries). See generally Thomas Ward Frampton, The
Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1593 (2018).
38. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
39. Id. at 311.
40. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
41. Id. at 221–22.
42. Id. at 206–09 & n.4. Women were not even considered for jury service.
Id. at 206.
43. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
44. Id. at 96–97.
45. Id. at 97 (“[T]he prosecutor’s explanation need not rise to the level
justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.”); see Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S.
231, 267–68 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the flaws in Batson);
Paul Butler, Mississippi Goddamn: Flowers v. Mississippi’s Cheap Racial
Justice, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 73, 82–83.
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the right to a unanimous jury,46 “race-based exclusion from jury
service” remains “central to criminal adjudication” in the United
States.47 Yet courts have been unwilling, with the exception of a
pair of Justices, to give constitutional guarantees meaning
through more dramatic steps like eliminating peremptory
strikes.48 At the time I delivered this Comment, the Court has
yet to decide whether the right to a unanimous jury should
apply retroactively, although it has granted certiorari to answer
this critical question.49 It may well decide it should not apply
retroactively, leaving defendants whose convictions violated the
Sixth Amendment without a remedy.
I raise these examples to highlight that the local concern
Mr. McCloy’s Note addresses is a component of a problem that
is endemic to our justice system. A right is meaningless unless
there is a way to guarantee its protection and substance.
That, I believe is where the second question connects to the
first. Keeping the community’s conscience in the dark about
sentencing norms interferes with defendants’ rights. Yet, even
when offered substantial discretion in sentencing, juries aimed
high. Mr. McCloy offers the example of Norell Sterling Ward, a
Black man convicted of two counts of possessing heroin with
intent to distribute and one count of conspiracy to distribute,
who faced a five-year minimum and forty-year maximum for
each count.50 The guidelines’ recommendation would have given
46. See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397 (“[I]f the Sixth Amendment’s right to a
jury trial requires a unanimous verdict to support a conviction in federal court,
it requires no less in state court.”).
47. Frampton, supra note 37, at 1623; see Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S.
Ct. 2228, 2235 (2019); Butler, supra note 45, at 84.
48. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The inherent
potential of peremptory challenges to distort the jury process by permitting
the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should ideally lead the Court to ban
them entirely from the criminal justice system.”); Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 273
(“I believe it necessary to reconsider Batson’s test and the peremptory
challenge system as a whole.”).
49. See Edwards v. Vannoy, 140 S. Ct. 2737, 2737–78 (2020) (Mem.)
(granting certiorari to consider “[w]hether this Court’s decision in Ramos v.
Louisiana, 590 U.S. ____ (2020), applies retroactively to case on federal
collateral review”).
50. See McCloy, supra note 3, at 564 & n.265.
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Ward a sentencing range from six years and four months to ten
years and five months.51 The jury recommended sixty-five years
or “a little under twenty-two years for each offense.”52 And
because juries operate in secrecy, it is impossible to know why
Mr. Ward’s jury settled on twenty-two years. We only know that
they did.
Jury sentencing provides an outlet for jurors to express the
community’s displeasure with a defendant’s transgressions.53
Without some method of channeling juror discretion, this
exercise in retributivism fails to satisfy the proportionality
necessary for retributive justice, rather than vengeance.54 It
also raises questions of whether Virginia’s sentencing system
invites unreasonably arbitrary penalties. It is possible that
jurors’ perceptions and sentencing preferences are colored by
their beliefs about the justice system, fairness, and what
particular defendants deserve. And given what we know about
race and the criminal justice system, we would be deluding
ourselves if we dismissed concerns that a defendant’s race may
be a factor in sentencing when a jury has a thirty-five-year
range to choose from without substantive guidance.55
Community standards of justice do not always comport with
what is actually just. Consider the history of all-White juries

51. See id. at 564–65.
52. See id. at 565.
53. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (“[C]apital punishment
is an expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct.”);
see also Chad Flanders, Time, Death, and Retribution, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
431, 434 (2016).
54. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982); Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005); Alexandra L. Klein, Volunteering to Kill 34
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
55. See generally Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black
Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995). Mr. McCloy’s
Note leaves open room for another interesting area of research—whether
juries deviate upward more frequently for Black defendants. While most states
generally ignore statistical evidence of racial bias to demonstrate
constitutional rights violations, such a study could show whether bias is a
possible factor in jury sentencing in Virginia. The sample size of such a study
in Virginia would be quite small, given the infrequency of jury trials. Such
research would nonetheless be valuable.
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sentencing Black men to death in trials held at record speed.56
None of us would agree that was justice. But members (White
ones, anyway) of that community at that time might have
thought it was just. Lynchings, a “tool of racial control,” offer
another example of a situation in which a particular
community’s brand of “justice” was deeply unjust.57 As for the
death penalty itself, there is substantial evidence that the
penalty is disproportionately applied when the victim is
White—reflecting community bias that certain lives matter
more.58 In a slightly different example, grand juries similarly
reflect community bias, “almost never” indicting police officers
who have killed unarmed civilians—another demonstration of
community preference leading to injustice.59
A jury may be a tool against government oppression.60 But
juries can also impose a community’s particular style of
oppression, such as racial discrimination.61 When a jury is
56. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53–58 (1932); see also EQUAL
JUST. INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF RACIAL
TERROR 62–63 (3d ed. 2017), https://perma.cc/5KVA-ZVEU (PDF) [hereinafter
LYNCHING IN AMERICA].
57. LYNCHING IN AMERICA, supra note 56, at 27–29, 32; Hoag, supra note
31, at 998–1001; Tania Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, 18 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 75, 82–84 (2009).
58. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312–18 (1987) (“The raw
numbers collected by [McCleskey] indicate that defendants charged with
killing white persons received the death penalty in 11% of the cases, but
defendants charged with killing blacks received the death penalty in only 1%
of the cases.”); id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (lamenting the majority’s
unwillingness to act upon McCleskey’s “striking evidence”); Hoag, supra note
31, at 992–93.
59. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Grand Jury’s Role in the Prosecution of
Unjustified Police Killings—Challenges and Solutions, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 397, 399–400 (2017).
60. Jury nullification is one example of a protection against government
oppression. See Butler, supra note 55, at 701–05.
61. See Tetlow, supra note 57, at 76–77. Of course, jury nullification,
referenced supra, can serve as a form of popular oppression ensuring that
wrongdoers go free. For example, a jury swiftly acquitted Roy Bryant and J.W.
Milam of the brutal torture and murder of Emmitt Till, (despite their belief in
the men’s guilt) and complied with Sheriff-Elect Harry Dogan’s request to
“wait awhile before returning a verdict in order to ‘make it look good.’” PAUL
H. ROBINSON & SARAH M. ROBINSON, SHADOW VIGILANTES: HOW DISTRUST IN
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unwilling to do justice for illegitimate reasons, or that jury
allows its own biases to enter the jury room, that jury deprives
the defendant of their Sixth Amendment right to an “impartial”
jury.62 Mr. McCloy has demonstrated that when a state’s
sentencing scheme conceals critical information from jurors, it
deprives the defendant of their Sixth Amendment right by
pressuring the defendant to waive their rights.
Virginia’s sentencing scheme left open too great an
invitation for personal bias to creep in. Mr. McCloy’s Note
highlights a key step for limiting jury discretion and ensuring
more equitable sentences. Yet more is to be done. Informing a
jury is an essential step, but it is equally important that the
members of our society who will serve as jurors understand that
the legitimacy of our criminal justice system rests on their
willingness to do impartial justice.
If we choose to keep jurors in the dark, knowing they are
likely to produce arbitrary and inequitable results, then the
Sixth Amendment’s right to an impartial jury is nothing more
than a meaningless guarantee.

JUSTICE SYSTEM BREEDS A NEW KIND OF LAWLESSNESS 35 (2018). Despite
the community’s preference for an acquittal, this sort of action, intended to
preserve White supremacy, is not justice—nor could it ever be.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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